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ABSTRACT
Setting up a large-scale wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is chal-
lenging, as firmware must be distributed and trust between sensor
nodes and a backend needs to be established. To perform this task
efficiently, we propose an approach named Box, which utilizes an
intelligent Faraday Cage (FC). The FC acquires firmware images
and secret keys from a backend, patches the firmware with the keys
and deploys those customized images over-the-air (OTA) to sensor
nodes placed in the FC. Electromagnetic (EM) shielding protects
this exchange against passive attackers. We place few demands on
the sensor node, not requiring additional hardware components or
firmware customized by the manufacturer. We describe this novel
workflow, implement the Box and a backend system and demon-
strate the feasibility of our approach by batch-deploying firmware
to multiple commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) sensor nodes. We con-
duct a user-study with 31 participants with diverse backgrounds
and find, that our approach is both faster and more user-friendly
than firmware distribution over a wired connection.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Hardware → Wireless integrated network sensors; • Se-
curity and privacy → Network security; • Human-centered
computing→ Usability testing; • Networks→ Network security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The initial setup phase of a wireless sensor network (WSN) usu-
ally comprises the distribution of up-to-date firmware to the sensor
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nodes as well as provisioning, i.e. assigning the sensor nodes to a
WSN and establishing trust between communicating parties, which
is typically done by exchanging cryptographic material such as
keys or certificates. To address the latter, various approaches for
key distribution have been proposed in literature. However, those
approaches are based on the assumption, that the firmware is "just
there", omitting, how the distribution of firmware is done.
Supplying firmware images manually via a programmer and
cable to a large number of sensor nodes is tedious and hardly scales.
Additionally, when sensors are deployed in harsh environments,
they are enclosed in a sealed casing. This limits access to the physi-
cal programming interfaces. Lastly, the person tasked with setting
up the WSN will likely not be a security expert, thus human error
must be expected and dealt with.
Rather than using wired interfaces, we propose a device and
work-flow called Box, which utilizes over-the-air (OTA) firmware
distribution inside a Faraday Cage (FC). Sensor nodes are prepared
with an OTA-capable bootloader by the device manufacturer. The
operator creates sensor node firmware images and individual sym-
metric keys in his backend. Images and secret keys are then trans-
ferred from the backend to the Box using e.g., a wired connection.
Afterwards, the Box can be detached and is portable. Next,the op-
erator places multiple sensor nodes inside the Box and closes it.
For every sensor node, the Box creates a customized image by
patching a unique secret key into the generic image and deploys
the customized image OTA to a particular node. Sensor nodes can
immediately begin to read sensors and exchange encrypted and
authenticated messages with the backend, as both share a secret
key. Electromagnetic (EM)-shielding protects this process against
eavesdropping, preventing an attacker from overhearing the secret
keys and the firmware, which might be intellectual property.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a work-
flow, which explicitly tackles the challenge of firmware distribution
using OTA updates in a shielded environment. We designed and im-
plemented the Box and the backend and demonstrate the complete
OTA firmware distribution process using commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) sensor nodes. We conducted a user study with 31 partici-
pants to evaluate our approach and found, that the Box surpasses
wired distribution in terms of speed and user satisfaction.
Road-map: In Section 2, we review approaches from industry and
previous literature. In Section 3, we describe the scenario, attacker
model and key ideas of our approach. In Section 4 we outline the
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Figure 1: Provisioning options for deploying WSNs
implementation. In Section 5, we conduct a user study and present
the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 COMPARISON TO OTHER APPROACHES
Typically, there are three parties involved in provisioning WSNs.
The chip manufacturer produces the microcontroller chips. The de-
vice manufacturer assembles a sensor node by joining chip, sensors,
printed circuit board and power supplies. Lastly, there is the opera-
tor, who installs the WSN. Using those role definitions, in Figure 1,
we compare solutions from industry and previous literature to our
Box-approach and discuss its benefits.
Industrial Solutions. In typical industrial solutions, as shown in
row one of Figure 1 the burden of supplying firmware images and
provisioning is shifted to the device manufacturer. This means
entrusting firmware (which might be confidential intellectual prop-
erty) as well as the secret key to the device manufacturer. Subse-
quently, keys need to be transferred to the WSN operator securely.
This approach is only feasible for high volume markets, as device
manufacturers might be unwilling to customize individual devices
in low volumes. Lastly, flashing firmware to sensor nodes in an
early stage of production forces the WSN operator to update the
firmware to the most recent version before deployment, causing
additional efforts.
Previous Literature. Approaches from previous literature are
shown in row two in Figure 1. Those works typically propose to ex-
change secrets or authentication information using location-limited
channels (LLCs) as proposed by Stajano and Balfanz [2, 34]. LLCs
enforce physical proximity and/or directivity. By doing so, they pro-
vide authenticity and, sometimes, confidentiality. An attacker send-
ing on those channels will be detected by the legitimate operator.
LLCs often used include visual channels using light [1, 2, 12, 30, 31],
sound [13, 33, 37] or the operator inserting data [6, 15, 20, 22], point-
ing a provisioning device [14, 36] or comparing data and confirming
equality [3, 5, 7, 21, 26, 27].
Creating LLCs has drawbacks: Firstly, sensor nodes must be
equipped with additional hardware, increasing their cost and size.
Secondly, letting the user perform security-critical tasks, e.g., com-
paring audio patterns and confirming their equality, is dangerous,
as minor operating errors can turn into critical security errors [8].
We are aware of three previous works, which propose the use of
a FC. The idea to use a FC to create a LLC has been mentioned in
one sentence by Castelluccia and Mutaf [6].
Kuo et al.were the first to implement this approach and show,
that exchanging symmetric keys between a base station and sensor
nodes in a FC is very user-friendly [18]. To reduce the signal to
noise ratio (SNR) at the attacker, Kuo et al. use a jammer attached
to the exterior of the Faraday cage [18].
Law et al. introduce a key management architecture for body
sensor networks, utilizing Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
key exchange inside a FC [19]. They also utilize a jammer attached
to the FC. While public key cryptography is beneficial in terms of
key management, it creates high demands on the computational
performance of a sensor node. Unlike our approach, their scheme
relies on the operator making security-critical decisions by forcing
her to configure the FC, which is error-prone.
Both Kuo et al. and Law et al. require a jammer outside the FC.
While this is beneficial to reduce the SNR at the attacker and hence
increases the security level, jamming power must adhere to regula-
tions and can not be set to arbitrarily high values. Further, benign
nearby devices might be jammed, too, decreasing their availability.
Our approach does not need a jammer, as we introduce a combi-
nation of software and chained hardware attenuators to reduce
the transmission power inside the Box to a low level. This, in addi-
tion with the shielding, results in a low SNR, effectively preventing
eavesdropping by an external attacker.
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Kuo et al. and Law et al. assume that a key exchange protocol is
present in the firmware of every sensor node. Their works focus on
distributing keys, assuming that the interface and protocol used to
exchange keys was delivered to the sensor node a priori by some
unspecified mechanism. Hence, it can be argued, that keys could
just have been transferred together with the firmware image over
the same wired connection. We, on the other hand, focus on the
initial distribution of firmware.
This Paper. Our Box-approach is shown in row three of Figure
1. We require COTS microcontrollers to be prepared with a OTA-
capable bootloader by the chip- or the device manufacturer or a
third party. This is a reasonable assumption, as the OTA bootloader
need not be customized. Rather, the Box adapts to the configuration
of the bootloader. Thus, chip or device manufacturers can ship all
microcontrollers with this default bootloader.
OTA is supported by many commonly used WSN transmission
protocols and sensor node platforms [16, 23, 24, 28, 32]. The primary
technical requirement is a sufficiently fast transmission channel
from the OTA update server to the sensor node. Our approach is
compatible with all those transmission standards and thus works
with many COTS sensor nodes.
What are the benefits of our approach? Users can supply runtime
firmware in-house. This means, that no confidential information
such as secret keys, nor the runtime firmware, which is intellectual
property of the commissioning party, need to be exposed to a third
party. Providing firmware right beforeWSN deployment guarantees
its freshness. With the Box, we have a portable secure environment,
in which we can update sensor node firmware in the field instead
of returning sensor nodes to the facility. A large number of sensor
nodes can be placed in the Box and provisioned simultaneously.
This improves speed and minimizes room for human error, since
the number of manual actions performed by the operator is reduced.
Unlike Kuo et al. , who need identical sensor nodes to be able to
perform simultaneous key distribution, we can provision different
types of sensor nodes at the same time. Lastly, we have a clear
split between OTA bootloader and runtime firmware. Thereby the
runtime firmware can be kept small, which is the main requirement
for stable operations and availability [9].
We consider our approach a leap towards real-world applicability,
reducing the number of hardware parts needed, not interfering with
nearby devices and especially solving the issue of initial firmware
distribution, which was previously assumed to happen implicitly.
3 BOX-BASED SOLUTION
Overview: Figure 2 shows the workflow, divided into steps 1○ to
3○. Our system has three entities: Box, backend and an arbitrary
number of sensor nodes. Initially, the backend creates a firmware
image and a number of unique secret keys using a true randomness
source. Next, the operator connects the Box to the backend using
e.g., a cable (step 1○). This can be considered a proximity-based
LLC, which achieves security against passive and active attacks.
Additionally, cryptographic mutual authentication between back-
end and Box should be used. The Box requests a firmware image
and keys from the backend and stores them into its memory. Now,
the Box can be unplugged and is fully portable.
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Figure 2: Firmware distribution and provisioning workflow
To deploy firmware to sensor nodes, the operator powers them
on, places them inside the Box and closes its lid. Upon detecting,
that it is shut tightly, the Box creates a wireless network within.
Each sensor node can now utilize its wireless transceiver to join
the network, request and acquire a firmware OTA from the Box.
Upon receiving such requests, the Box patches individual keys into
the firmware image and sends the now unique firmware to the
node. This process is protected from an external attacker against
eavesdropping, as the walls of the box shield EM waves and the
Box transmits at low power (step 2○).
Afterwards, the operator removes the sensor nodes from the Box
and deploys them. Every sensor node reboots, now using the new
firmware image. This image contains functions to read sensors, the
address of the backend and credentials to access the network created
by the backend. Now, the sensor node can initiate cryptographically
secured communication with the backend, since they share a secret
key (step 3○).
Attacker Model. The goal of the attacker is to learn the firmware
and secret keys exchanged between the Box and the sensor nodes.
He is computationally bounded, implying that his computing power
is polynomial at most. We assume the attacker to be present before,
during and after firmware distribution. During every phase, he may
launch passive or active wireless attacks.
We assume the sensor node supply chain to be trusted including
the operator, who deploys the sensor nodes using the Box. This
means, that no desired hardware or software is inserted into a sen-
sor node. Trusting the supply chain is a common assumption, as
searching for hardware implants in every device bought is unfeasi-
ble and requires dedicated equipment.
The operator is no security expert, however, he is assumed to
be aware of his surroundings, i.e. able to notice obviously strange
events.
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We assume that the attacker neither has physical access to the
backend, nor to the Box. He might capture sensor nodes, after they
have been set up by the Box.
3.1 Box
The Box comprises a Faraday Cage, a single board computer (SBC),
wireless transceivers, battery, an open/close sensor and the user
interface (UI). The UI consists of a speaker, two pushbuttons with
built-in status LEDs (the acquire and the deploy button) and the
power button, all placed inside and only accessible, while the Box
is open.
The Box is modeled as a five-state state machine, which is shown
in Figure 3. States are based on the Box being opened or closed
and whether its internal memory contains firmware images and
keys. Transition between those states is initiated by the operator
performing manual actions, such as opening or closing the box
and pressing a button. Security-relevant tasks such as downloading
firmware and keys from the backend into the Box and the actual
firmware distribution process are conducted automatically by the
Box.
The speaker provides information about the current state and
what the operator has to do next. Our study confirmed, that au-
dio is clearly understandable despite the box being closed. Using
a speaker has several benefits over using e.g., LEDs: Firstly, me-
chanical integrity and EM shielding are not impaired, as no wires
need to be led through the enclosure of the Box. Secondly, spoken
audio feedback is more explicit than encoding information into
LED on/off state and coloring.
The Box utilizes both software and hardware attenuation mech-
anisms to transmit at very low power barely enough for the sensor
nodes inside the Box to receive the messages. We can utilize such
low transmission power, because the EM shielding protects com-
munications inside the Box from external interference, e.g., from
harsh industrial environments. Low transmit power in addition to
the EM shielding protects the firmware-plus-key exchange from
eavesdropping attacks by the remote adversary.
3.1.1 State Machine. After power-up, the Box checks, if at least
one firmware image and a number of keys greater than a preset
threshold reside in its memory. If the actual number is below the
threshold, it moves to the BoxOpen_NoFW state. The operator con-
nects the Box to the backend and presses the acquire button. The
Box automatically acquires a firmware image and secret keys and
stores those. Then, it moves to the BoxOpen_FW state.
If the Box is closed, while the deploy pushbutton has not been
pressed, the Box transitions into the BoxClosed_FW state, in which
it can be carried conveniently. The Deploy_FW state is entered,
from the BoxOpen_FW state, after the operator has pressed the de-
ploy pushbutton and closed the box. Now the Box creates a wireless
network using the transmission protocol and connection parame-
ters expected by the sensor nodes. For example, if WiFi is used, the
name and passphrase of the access point as well as the address, at
which the webserver serving the firmware images can be reached,
match the factory defaults stored in the OTA bootloader of the
sensor nodes. Hence, the Box adapts to the sensor nodes.
If the operator forgot to place nodes inside the Box, the Box
waits for requests for a certain time. If no requests were received,
the Box informs the operator about this. Then, it moves to the
BoxClosed_FW state, where it resides until it is opened by the oper-
ator.
To program sensor nodes, the operator places powered-on sensor
nodes with an OTA bootloader in the Box, presses the deploy button
and closes the Box. Sensor nodes connect to the wireless network
created by the Box, and request firmware images from the box.
Upon receiving an OTA request from the sensor nodes, the received
keys are patched into the firmware binary and deleted from the
key database of the Box. Binary patching is computationally less
expensive then compiling each firmware with its individual key and
thus much faster, speeding up the firmware distribution process.
Additionally, the Box does not need development toolchains for
sensor nodes, improving maintainability. It is able to sign firmware
images, which is discussed in Section 3.1.5.
The box counts individual device addresses, e.g., MAC addresses
from which it received requests. After deployment is finished, the
Box informs the operator about the number of sensor nodes pro-
visioned and instructs the operator to open the Box and remove
the sensor nodes. Upon opening, if the remaining number of keys
inside the database of the Box is higher than a threshold, the Box
moves to the BoxOpen_FW state, else to the BoxOpen_NoFW state.
How does the box know, if all sensor nodes have been supplied
with firmware? Our user study described in Section 5 shows, that
operators are aware of how many nodes they placed inside the
box. Thus, operators notice a mismatch between the number of
provisioned nodes the Box announced and the number of nodes they
placed inside the Box. If sensor nodes have an LED, they can issue
a blink pattern after having received the new firmware, indicating
success. Else, if an optical marker such as a QR-code is present,
solutions such as the one proposed in [35] can be used to inspect
the sensor node.
While the Box is closed, wireless transmissions inside are secured
against eavesdropping by the EM shielding in conjunction with the
low transmission power. If the open/close-sensor of the Box detects,
that it is opened while deployment is in process, it performs a panic
abort, since an opened FC does not shield EM waves sufficiently. As
the Box expects an attack, it erases all secret keys from its database
and informs the operator. Then, it moves to the BoxOpen_NoFW
state.
3.1.2 Benefits of Our Approach. As the pushbuttons and sensors,
which cause state transitions, have been placed inside the Box, the
mechanical design ensures, that no unintended states are reached,
the most dangerous state would be Deploy_FW while the Box is
opened. This is accomplished by reducing security-critical tasks to
simple manual actions. Those manual actions hide the complexity
of OTA firmware distribution, while they still allow the operator to
determine cause and effect of his actions. Hence, possibilities for
handling errors are minimized by keeping the operator out of the
loop while providing her a sense of control [8].
The number of sensor nodes which can be provisioned simultane-
ously is only limited by the physical dimensions and the maximum
number of addresses supported by the network protocol. Any COTS
sensor node can be used with the Box, as long as the sensor node
uses an OTA-capable transmission protocol and has been supplied
Secure and User-Friendly Over-the-Air Firmware Distribution in a Portable Faraday Cage WiSec ’20, July 8–10, 2020, Linz (Virtual Event), Austria
BoxOpen_NoFW
Deploy_FWconnected to
backend and
acquire button 
pressed
deployment
in process?
open
BoxClosed_FW
FW avail. 
&& number
of keys
> threshold
finish
true
BoxClosed_NoFW
BoxOpen_FW
panic abort
true
false
close
open
close
open
deploy button
press and close
false
power
switch
on
FW avail. 
&& number
of keys
> threshold
true
false
Figure 3: State machine of the Box
with an OTA bootloader, e.g., by the device manufacturer. Our ap-
proach does neither require hardware modifications, nor changes
to the OTA bootloader, as the Box adapts to the configuration of
the bootloader and not vice versa.
The Box supports simultaneous distribution of firmware to non-
homogeneous sensor nodes. For example, the operator can place
sensor nodes using WiFi and other nodes using Bluetooth in the
Box and supply different firmware images to those at the same time.
The Box could also contain multiple firmware images configured
for different tasks (e.g., read different sensors mounted at the same
sensor node). Then, the operator could choose on-site and right
before deployment, which firmware image shall be used and thus
which quantity should be metered by the sensor. This brings high
flexibility: In previous approaches, the decision which firmware is
delivered to which node has been made way earlier (e.g., during
sensor node production). Our approach maximizes the time for
firmware development, ensuring that the most recent and mature
firmware version is on the node. Finally, the Box can be used to
update sensor node firmware in the field. For this purpose the
sensor node is brought into bootloader mode. Then, the Box is used
just like in initial firmware distribution, its shielding providing a
portable secure environment.
3.1.3 Shielding for Eavesdropping Security. We want to protect
the exchange of firmware with an embedded secret key against a
passive remote attacker. We assume a strong attacker, who knows
how the wireless packets are structured, i.e. how the firmware is
split into the payload blocks andwhere to find the key in a particular
firmware chunk.
Obtaining information by eavesdropping is impossible if the
received power PRX is lower than the sensitivity of the attacker’s
receiver. Additionally, the received signal strength must be below
the noise floor, i.e. the SNR is too low to be able to distinguish
information from noise.
Using a radio link budget equation and taking into account the
attenuation provided by the Box, the signal strength at the attacker
can be calculated as:
PRX = PTX +GTX − LFSPL +GRX − LBox (1)
where PRX is the power received by the attacker, PTX the transmis-
sion power of the sender,GTX gains at the sender,GRX gains at the
receiver, LFSPL the free space path loss and LBox the attenuation
of the Box. We control PTX ,GTX and LBox , while the attacker can
influence LFSPL and GRX .
The free space path loss is given by:
LFSPL = 20 · loд10(d) + 20 · loд10(f ) − 67.55 (2)
where d is the distance between sender and receiver in centimeters
and f the frequency in megahertz. In Equation 1, we do not consider
fading or losses caused by antenna polarization mismatch. Those
would increase attenuation and contribute to the protection level.
As we calculate a worst-case scenario here, we omit them.
Unlike previous solutions using a FC, we do not require a jammer
mounted externally to the Box. First, we determined the minimal
transmission power PTX , at which the sensor nodes used are still
able to receive wireless messages. For the sensor nodes used in
our example, this PTX ,min is about −90dBm [11]. Hence, we feed
signals from the wireless interface of the Box through a chain of
four 20dB hardware attenuators before being passed to the antenna.
We reduce PTX in software to cancel the antenna gain and set PTX
so low that sensor nodes within the Box are just able to receive the
signal, in our example slightly above −90dBm. The EM shielding
provided by the Box reduces interference from outside the Box,
permitting communications at this low transmission power. As
sensor nodes do not transmit confidential information and they
must be able, to reach a backend far away, their transmission power
does not need to be adjusted.
Example Calculations. Transmitting at 2.4 GHz, assuming LBox
at 40dB, LFSPL = 34dB in a distance of 50 cm and GRX at 30dB,
we calculate PRX ,Attacker = −134dBm. This lies well below the
sensitivity of typical receivers an attacker would use, which is
around -96 dBm [29]. Note, that we can safely assume that the
operator of the Box would notice an attack setup this physically
close to him. The attacker could use more powerful (and thus larger)
antennas and wireless receivers to achieve a higher signal strength,
however, his presence can be detected more easily then. To account
for that, our hardware-store Box prototype, which attenuates by
40 dB, can be exchanged for commercial solutions offering shielding
greater than 70dB.
The SNR at the attacker’s receiver is derived as follows: For
exchanging firmware, in our tests, we use 802.11n WiFi at 20MHz
channel width and the maximal data rate of 150Mbps supported by
the sensor nodes used in our experiments. Assuming only thermal
noise (a worst-case assumption security-wise) at bandwidth B =
20MHz and room temperature, the noise floor of the attacker’s
receiver is −101dBm. The SNR is thus −134dBm − (−101dBm) =
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−33dB. We transfer each individual key only once, so the attacker
can not reduce noise by combining multiple transmissions.
To achieve channel capacity for a data rate of 150Mbps , we
require a SNR of SN = 2
C/B − 1, which evaluates to 17.4dB. Note
that this is the best-case assumption for the attacker: It only holds
true using optimal coding, which is not given in practice.
Those calculations show, that even close to the Box and assuming
fairly low attenuation by the Box, the received power PRX is lower
than the minimal receive power required by a typical attacker.
Further, the SNR at the attacker is so low, that channel capacity
can not be achieved, hence received information will be erroneous.
Thus, the attacker will not be able to learn the firmware image and
the secret keys by eavesdropping.
To be able to maintain those security levels, the box must be
shut tight during firmware distribution, which is checked by the
open/close sensor in the Deploy_FW state. If the Box is opened
during key exchange, all keys are deleted from the memory of the
Box and the operator is warned.
3.1.4 Security Against Active Wireless Attacks. An attacker might
launch a rogue wireless network with the same identifier the Box
would use to create its network. By doing so, sensor nodes are
tricked into joining the attacker’s network. There, they are supplied
with malicious firmware and network credentials of the attacker’s
backend network. Subsequently, sensor nodes would send their
sensor readings to the malicious backend network instead of the
intended network.
This type of attack is made difficult by the shielding of the Box,
which reduces the signal strength of the rogue network inside the
Box to low levels. Thus, sensor nodes inside the closed box will only
detect and potentially join that network, if the attacker uses very
high transmission power, As an additional means of protection, the
Box can permanently monitor the wireless spectrum. If it detects
a network with the same identifier and channel setting it would
use to create its own wireless network, it issues a spoken warning.
The Box can not prevent, that sensor nodes have joined the rogue
network. The operator is instructed to turn off the sensor nodes
and consider them compromised.
3.1.5 Security Discussion. How does the backend know, whether
a key has been deleted from the box and thus invalidated? The Box
could have a wireless communications channel to the backend, over
which those information could be communicated. As we can not
guarantee that this channel is available, the backend also stores the
last time a key has been used. It can be configured to automatically
blacklist a key, which has been sent to the Box, but which has not
been seen in use by a sensor node for a given time.
How to use signed firmware images with the Box? The Box can
contain a public-private key-pair, whose private key is used for
firmware signing. This key should be stored in a hardware security
module (HSM). If a sensor node is placed in the Box for the first
time, its OTA bootloader does not check the signature of firmware
updates. Adding user-specific public keys to the bootloader would
imply that themanufacturer adapts the bootloader to each customer,
contradicting our approach. If the device manufacturer would add
a default public key to all sensor nodes shipped, the corresponding
private key would need to be delivered to all parties acquiring
those nodes. By doing so, the firmware signing process would be
rendered useless. Instead, in our approach during the very first
firmware update, the Box does not distribute a runtime firmware.
Rather, it delivers a new OTA bootloader to the sensor nodes, which
now contains the public key of the Box. This bootloader replaces the
old one by overwriting the bootloader sectors in flash. Now, as the
public key is present, all subsequent OTA firmware updates must be
signed by the Box and the sensor node can check the authenticity
of those updates. Since an remote attacker does not possess the
private key needed to sign firmware images and given that debug
interfaces are locked, the OTA bootloader can not be overwritten
again. Hence, the sensor node now only accepts firmware updates
signed by the Box.
How to detect a malicious node inside the Box? Note, that the
Box can not detect hardware implants in sensor nodes, as this would
require sophisticated equipment. For this reason, as stated in the
section Attacker Model, we must assume the sensor node supply
chain including the operator to be trusted. If we deviate from this
assumption, it could be imagined that an attacker prepares a sensor
node with a malicious firmware, which eavesdrops and records all
firmware transfers inside the Box. As the firmware images contain
secret keys, the attacker could remove the malicious node later or
exfiltrate the confidential data captured via a wireless channel. This
data can than be analyzed to extract all keys distributed in this run
of the Box.
In order to prevent this kind of attack from inside the Box, Secure
Erasure techniques proposed by Perito et al. can be applied [25].
Those are used after we have updated the OTA bootloader with the
one containing our public key and before deploying our runtime
firmware. Sensor nodes are forced to delete their memory, thus
removing potentially malicious code. The malicious node, placed
inside the box can act by either answering to the erasure request or
ignore it. A node is not able to fake the verification of the erasure,
therefore it is detectable if the memory was cleared.
If all nodes respond, the Box can verify that the whole memory
is securely erased, and proceed with firmware and key exchange.
However, if a node does not communicate at all, the Box can not
notice this. As discussed earlier, it is a reasonable assumption, that,
the operator knows, howmany nodes were put in the box. After the
firmware update, the Box announces, how many nodes have been
securely erased and written with the new firmware. The operator
intuitively sees the difference of nodes placed into the Box versus
nodes supplied with firmware. Thus, he can detect that not all nodes
were flashed. He can choose to flash the batch again (e.g individually
or pairwise to reduce the effort and find which nodes were not
flashed). This ensures, that only nodes, which have been erased
securely and supplied with the desired firmware image are added
to the network.
3.2 Backend
The backend has the largest computational resources in the system.
It can utilize a true randomness source and creates secret individual
keys. Additionally, it compiles firmware images for the different
sensor node types used. Afterwards, the backend waits for the Box
to be connected. Mutual authentication between the backend and
the Box can be accomplished using known protocols, e.g., TLS.
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Upon receiving a valid download request, the backend transfers
firmware images and a list with secret keys to the Box.
Keys are stored in a database together with an identity derived
from that key. This identity derivation function can be a cryp-
tographically secure hash functions such as SHA-256, making it
impossible to deduce the secret key from the identity.
Besides distributing firmware and keys, the backend creates a
wireless network to which sensor nodes connect and send data.
Upon receiving a message from a sensor node, the backend extracts
the sender’s identity and uses it as a search index in the database.
Thereby, the secret key assigned to that particular sensor node can
be found efficiently. With the secret key, the backend validates the
authenticity of messages received and decrypts them.
3.3 Sensor Nodes
After power-up, the sensor node has no runtime-firmware image.
Subsequently, it queries a network address, on which the Box listens
and responds. Upon receiving a request, if signed firmware images
are used, the Box prepares an OTA bootloader with a public key
and supplies it to the sensor node. Using the new OTA bootloader,
the sensor node requests a runtime firmware-image. The Box cus-
tomizes a firmware image by injecting a secret key and delivers it.
The sensor node validates this firmware image and writes it into
its Bootloadable memory region and reboots, loading this image.
It contains functions to read sensors, the cryptographic key used
for encrypting and authenticating messages as well as the address
and network credentials of the backend. Thus, the sensor node can
immediately start reading sensors and transmit those readings to
the backend securely. Every sensor node derives an identifier from
its secret key using the same derivation function as the backend and
appends this identifier (or a digest from it) to messages. This aids
the backend in finding the secret key assigned to that particular
sensor node.
Provisioning sensor nodes with the Box neither requires addi-
tional transceivers, nor I/O such as buttons or a display as it would
be required for many LLC approaches. In the runtime-firmware,
we do not need functions for interfacing this additional hardware,
neither do we need a key exchange protocol. We merely require the
sensor nodes to have an OTA bootloader and to be able to commu-
nicate with a transmission protocol capable of sending data from
the backend to the sensor node. This bootloader can utilize a default
network address to connect to. We do not require customization of
the bootloader.
As we use OTA updates to program the sensor node, debug
interfaces can be locked. This aids in protecting the firmware from
being read and keys from being extracted. Using the Box, every
sensor node has an individual secret key, which reduces damage in
case a single sensor node gets captured and its firmware extracted.
We can leverage the support for multiple transmission protocols
offered by modern System-on-Chips (SOCs). For example, the sen-
sor node can acquire the firmware OTA using WiFi for high-speed
download. If the sensor node should be used in a body area net-
work (BAN) [10, 19], the runtime-firmware image could contain a
Bluetooth stack. If long-range transmissions are needed, LoRAWAN
could be used. If the sensor node is assigned a different task, it can
be brought back into Bootloader mode and then supplied with
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Figure 4: The Box prototype
a new firmware image using the Box. Hence, our approach per-
mits convenient switching to the transmission protocol being the
optimal choice for a given task.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Box
The Box is made up of a COTS lockable aluminum case spaced
320mm · 230mm · 150mm. We covered the interior of the case
with copper-sheets and -tape and metered the attenuation provided
by our DIY shielded Box to be at least 40 dB. This low-cost design
permits creating a box for less than 100 Euro, permitting widespread
use. If higher levels of shielding are desired, a commercial box
should be used.
Figure 4 shows our prototype implementation of the Box. Inside
the Box, a Raspberry Pi Model 3 (Pi) 1○, a battery pack 2○, a power
button 3○, the deploy 4○ and the acquire pushbutton 5○ with built-
in green and blue LEDs and a speaker 6○ are attached. Using a
tailored enclosure, only the buttons, the speaker and the Ethernet
interface 7○, which connects the Pi and the backend, are exposed
to the user. This prevents faulty operation by limiting the possible
interactions. The user is instructed about the current state and how
to proceed by spoken output over the speaker. Whenever the user
is audibly instructed to press a particular button, the built-in LED
of this button is flashed.
We monitor the state of the Box (e.g., whether its opened or
closed) with a Hall Sensor 8○ connected to a GPIO pin and hooked
to an interrupt handler. The magnet 9○, which activates the Hall
sensor, is attached to the lid. All invalid transitions (e.g., open lid
during firmware distribution) result in a secure fail state that deletes
all secret data in the memory of the Box, as we must assume, that
the key exchange has been compromised due to the absence of EM
shielding.
The Pi acquires firmware images and keys from the backend us-
ing Ethernet. It can use its built-in WiFi and Bluetooth transceivers
to communicate with sensor nodes. To support other transmission
protocols, additional transceivers can be attached via Universal
Serial Bus (USB). In our tests we used the built-in WiFi interface
of the Pi. When deploying firmware (thus the Box being in closed
state), the Raspberry Pi creates a WiFi access point (AP). Firmware
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Figure 5: The backend graphical user interface (GUI)
requests sent to the AP are handled by a webserver, which in return
sends the firmware patched with individual keys to the nodes. Mul-
tiple requests can be handled simultaneously, thus, several sensor
nodes can be served in parallel.
We decided to use the more powerful backend to build the im-
ages and transfer them to the Box rather than compiling in the
Box. Patching of firmware images is done by opening the image
and replacing the key placeholder with an individual key. Subse-
quently, the Box signs firmware images. By doing so, we are able
to decrease the time needed in the field when deploying firmware
images to nodes, as patching with keys and signing is much faster
than compiling.
Security against eavesdropping is achieved by combining the
EM shielding of the Box with hardware signal attenuation. For that,
we replaced the Pi’s built-in WiFi antenna with an SMA connector.
By chaining analog SMA-attenuators before the antenna 10○, the
transmission is reduced to the minimum power level at which the
sensor nodes are still able to receive packets (about -90 dBm for
our sensor nodes). This renders the external jammer needed by
previous works obsolete.
4.2 Backend
Our backend is written in Python3 and runs on an Industrial Com-
puter (IPC). The GUI built with the tkinter package is shown in
Figure 5. It has buttons for creating and deleting firmware images
and secret keys. The process of creating keys can also be performed
automatically.
Communication between backend and Box uses Hypertext Trans-
fer Protocol (HTTP) over Ethernet, however we plan to use HTTPS
in the future. To initiate the sensor node setup process, the user
plugs the Box into the IPC. The backend runs a Dynamic Host Con-
figuration Protocol (DHCP) server, which supplies the Box with an
IP address. It also runs a webserver, from which the Box requests a
firmware image and secret keys up to a preset number.
For receiving sensor node readings, a WiFi AP is created by the
backend. The sensor node knows the credentials of the access point
as well as the address of the webserver, to which sensor readings
shall be sent, as they have been included in the firmware images
delivered to the sensor node by the Box. Thus, immediately after
setup, sensor nodes search for the backend WiFi network, join it
and post sensor readings to the webserver.
4.3 Sensor Nodes
We implemented the sensor nodes using PYCOM LoPy4 develop-
ment boards (based on the ESP32 microcontroller (MCU)) and the
Pysense sensor shield. These nodes support four wireless interfaces:
WiFi, Bluetooth (BT), LoRAWAN and SIGFOX. Further, they are
capable of performing OTA firmware updates over WiFi and Lo-
RAWAN out of the box. We used OTA over WiFi with the default
SSID, WiFi passphrase and webserver address set by the manufac-
turer. The Box uses those defaults to launch an access point and a
webserver, at which it serves firmware updates. By using this setup,
we do not have to adjust the OTA bootloader, as the Box adapts to
the sensor node and not the other way round.
5 USABILITY STUDY
Purpose and Scope: The aim of this usability studywas to compare
the speed and user-friendliness of setting up a WSN using wired
provisioning compared to our Box. In the following, those two
approaches are called Wired and Box. The task for the subjects
was to supply firmware to sensor nodes using both approaches.
Wired can be considered the traditional approach for small volumes
of sensor nodes. It is automated to some extend using a script,
which takes care of creating and injecting a unique key into the
sensor node firmware image and writing the image to the node via
Universal Asynchronous Receive Transmit (UART).
We investigate the following hypotheses:
(1) Using the Box to provision sensor nodes needs less time than
using wired provisioning. The advantage in speed increases,
the more sensor nodes are to be provisioned.
(2) Using the Box is intuitive and does not permit the user to
make security-critical errors.
Experimental Design and Setup: The two approaches Box and
Wired are compared within-subjects, i.e. all participants performed
both approaches. We used LoPy4 sensor nodes and a laptop running
Ubuntu 18.04. To interface the laptop with the LoPy, we used
esptool.py, a command-line tool, for which we created a clickable
desktop icon for easier use.
Subjects were given the task to set up a WSN by programming
sensor nodes. They were further instructed, that upon issuing a
particular code word, the experiment supervisor would show up
and assist them. The code word prevented accidental or inexplicit
calls for help.
Sample: We recruited a total of N = 31 subjects. 21 of them
were male, 10 female. The age of the subjects ranged between 23
and 53 years. N1 = 20 subjects were from computer science and
electrical engineering study programs. For those, we assumed a
certain familiarity with networking, embedded systems and secu-
rity. Hereinafter, they will be called experts. To test whether the
Box approach is suitable for users with no technical background,
we recruited additional N2 = 11 participants. Five of those had a
academic degree we considered unrelated to the task, while six did
not have an academic degree at all. Hereinafter, they will be called
novices.
Procedure: Prior to execution, the supervisor explained the test
scenario, described the tasks to be performed and explained his
own role as technical support. Next, subjects were given a printed
instruction sheet in their native language. They were asked to read
aloud the instruction sheet and ask questions on the instructions.
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There were no questions raised in the final study, as we had eval-
uated the instruction sheet in a pilot study with six subjects and
adjusted it to answer all questions raised there.
Subjects were provided with a switched-on laptop, its desktop
clearly showing the executable icon for initiating wired program-
ming, and four LoPy4 sensor nodes. They were asked to supply
firmware to those four sensor nodes using Wired. For that, they
were instructed to connect the sensor node to the computer used
for programming, hold a pushbutton to enter the bootloader mode,
execute the script and finally unplug the node.
To evaluate the Box approach, subjects were given the Box pro-
totype and four LoPY4 sensor nodes, all switched on prepared with
an OTA over WiFi-capable bootloader. The Box already held a
firmware image and a sufficient number of secret keys in its mem-
ory. This setup resembles a scenario in which the shift manager
had supplied keys to the Box at the beginning of the shift. A normal
worker provisioning the sensor nodes would not be permitted to
interact with the Backend system. Subjects were instructed to place
all four nodes together in the Box, press the deploy-button and
close the Box. Then they were supposed to wait, while the Box
programmed sensor nodes, until the Box instructed them to open
it and remove the sensor nodes.
To control for learning effects, e.g., embedded device handling,
after each participant, the order of Wired and Box was randomized.
Further, this accounts for opinions from one approach influencing
the opinion on the other approach. After subjects had completed
the firmware distribution process, we asked them for qualitative
feedback on their experience with the Box using the 10-item Likert
scale System Usability Scale (SUS), which is widely used [4].
Measurement: We measured the time needed to provision sensor
nodes from the moment the subject consciously stated "start" until
all sensor nodes were provisioned successfully. We counted the
number of hesitations, errors and calls for support made. Hereby,
hesitation denotes a time span of at least three seconds, in which
the subject did not proceed. Hesitations are not necessarily related
to an error, which denotes doing something different from the
instruction sheet. Those metrics map to the usability attributes
learnability, attractiveness, user-friendlyness, low cost to operate and
security interaction according to ISO 9241-110:2006 [17].
5.1 Results
Due to the small sample size data were only analyzed descriptively.
Results are summarized in Table 1.
Time Needed: Using Wired, both experts and the novices took
around 42 s to program the first sensor node. For sensor node four,
it took them an average of 23 s. One run of the Box with four sensor
nodes inside took the experts an average of 30.9 s and the novices
29.7 s.
Hesitations and errors: With Wired, the novices hesitated twice
and made three errors. All of them could be attributed to the subject
struggling with the button to enter the bootloader mode. With the
Box, one hesitation and zero errors were counted. The subject
thought only a single node was to be placed in the Box. After re-
reading the instruction sheet, the subject placed the remaining
sensor nodes in the Box and proceeded.
Table 1: Study results. Times given forwired deployment are
per node, for the Box for one run with four nodes.
Wired Box
N
ov
ic
es Time needed [s]:
#1 #2 #3 #4 total
42.3 35.3 26.3 24.2 29.7
Hesitations: 2 1
Errors: 3 0
Support calls: 0 0
Ex
pe
rt
s Time needed [s]:
#1 #2 #3 #4 total
42.9 29.9 27.2 22.6 30.9
Hesitations: 5 2
Errors: 4 1
Support calls: 0 2
Table 2: SUS results
Question # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Experts: 4.9 1.2 5.0 1.3 4.8 1.1 4.9 1.1 4.3 1.2
Novices: 4.8 1.0 5.0 1.6 4.8 1.2 5.0 1.0 4.9 1.1
The experts hesitated five times and made four errors using
wired distribution, while there were two hesitations and one error
using the Box. All errors and hesitations during wired distribution
were related to the bootloader mode button, e.g., the button not
being pressed, searching the button at the laptop screen rather at
the sensor node or pressing and releasing the button immediately.
The hesitations caused by the Box are related to the subjects not
having understood the audio feedback and hence, they were not
sure whether the programming process had finished. The error was
caused by the subject turning off the Box, despite the power switch
being in the clearly marked "on" position and the green deploy
button flashing.
Number of support calls: The novices requested the support zero
times for both approaches, while the experts asked two times using
the Box. Both occurrences were caused by the Box prototype not
responding to the deploy button press.
SUS: Results from the SUS questionnaire are shown in Table 2.
Subjects gave overall good grades. Differences between experts and
novices are negligible.
Qualitative feedback: Subjects described the Box as very practical
and intuitive to operate. They liked the gain in speed over the
wired approach and that the Box supersedes cable handling for
placing devices and operating the Box lid. The voice instructions
were perceived helpful and could be understood easily. Subjects felt
reminded of automated external defibrillators, which also give step-
by-step instructions. As the Box informed the user that firmware
exchange was finished and the Box could be opened, subjects were
able to judge the success of deployment reliably.
5.2 Discussion
As expected, the Box outperforms wired distribution in terms of
speed and scalability. Two aspects contribute to the total time
needed for one run: Firstly, time needed for devices to commu-
nicate, download the firmware and write the new firmware image
to flash memory. Secondly, the time needed for device handling.
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Concerning the former, the gain in speed stems from OTA pro-
gramming inside the Box taking place in parallel, while the wired
approach is limited to programming one sensor node at a time.
For device handling time, independently from previous experience,
both groups became quicker while handling the sensor nodes in
the wired approach. Assuming the fastest time needed for wired
programming of one sensor node, which is about 23 s, we extrap-
olate that provisioning two nodes takes about 46 s. Using the Box
to set up four sensor nodes took both groups about 30 s. Thus, we
can conclude, that the Box is faster than wired provisioning, as
soon as more than one sensor node is to be programmed. Using the
Box, device handling times varied, because some subjects arranged
sensor nodes neatly inside the Box, while others just took the bunch
of four and dropped them randomly. While sensor nodes can be
successfully provisioned at any position inside the Box, as stated
in Section 3.1, the operator should be aware, how many sensor
nodes have been placed inside. Hence, it seems useful to structure
the interior of the Box such that one sensor node resides at one
position, e.g., by adding foam-cutouts.
The SUS and the qualitative feedback show, that subjects con-
sider the Box intuitive, easy to use and well integrated. Especially
subjects, who had received industrial training, liked, that operating
the Box requires only simple manual actions, which they felt confi-
dent doing. They also liked, that the Box hides away the electrical
and software aspects, which are exposed in wired programming.
Subjects stated, that this reduced their worries of breaking some-
thing.
One error was made, as the subject turned the already switched
Box off. Support was called twice, as the Box prototype did not
respond to the button press. Two subjects from the experts group
wished to be able to understand better, what is happening internally.
They asked for more fine-grained information, e.g., with which sen-
sor node the Box is communicating at the moment. To account for
that, the Box should provide more precise feedback more often by
playing repeated audio feedback without the user performing an ac-
tion. Alternatively, a help button could be added, which, upon being
pressed, tells about the current state and how to proceed. Overall,
all subjects felt more confident and expressed higher satisfaction
using the Box compared to wired programming.
Outlook: In this study, we did not induce arbitrary errors to
investigate, how the subjects recover from those. This is not realistic
in our industrial scenario: In case of an error, a subject will always
call the supervisor and ask for help. Here, we favored amore realistic
experiment over trying to evaluate edge cases. As future work, we
are going to evaluate the Box in a industrial production environment
to learn, how the subjects cope with the Box in harsh environments.
6 CONCLUSION
We have designed and implemented the Box, an intelligent Faraday
Cage (FC), which can supply firmware images and secret keys to
large numbers of sensor nodes in a user-friendly manner using
over-the-air (OTA) updates. Previously proposed approaches are
based on the assumption, that the firmware is "just there", omitting,
how the distribution of firmware is done. In contrast, we demon-
strate a complete workflow for both firmware deployment and the
exchange of device-individual secret keys leveraging OTA firmware
transmission protected by the FC. OTA requires a wireless transmis-
sion protocol, which permits transmissions from an update server
to a sensor node. As this is the case for transmission protocols
commonly used in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), the Box can
be used with most commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) sensor node
platforms.
The proposed workflow shifts security relevant tasks from the
operator to the Box, thus minimizing room for human error. Manual
actions are reduced to opening and closing the box and placing and
removing sensor nodes. The Box instructs the operator via spoken
commands. Our usability study shows, that both technically adept
and non-tech-savvy operators are able to use the Box intuitively and
can deploy firmware faster compared to the classic wired approach.
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